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SIXTH AMENDMENT-DEFENDANT'S
DUAL BURDEN IN CLAIMS OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Strickland v. Washington,' the Supreme Court, for the first
time, established standards for determining whether a defense at-
torney's performance denied a defendant the constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel. 2 The Court held that a defendant
must overcome two separate burdens to establish a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance.3 First, a defendant must show that counsel acted
"unreasonably" as measured by the prevailing norms of the profes-
sion.4 Second, a defendant must show that counsel's incompetent
assistance prejudiced the defense by rendering the proceeding fun-
damentally unfair.5 The Court stated that the defendant need not
prove that counsel's unreasonable conduct likely affected the out-
come of the case; the defendant need prove only that the incompe-
tent assistance created a reasonable probability that, but for
1 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
2 The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Recognizing the "fundamental fairness" notion
in the sixth amendment, the Supreme Court has held that, in capital cases, the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the effective appointment of counsel.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). More recently, the Court has noted that
"the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (citing Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90
(1955)). The McMann Court further stated that counsel must not commit "serious dere-
lictions," but rather, must perform "within the range of competence demanded of attor-
neys in criminal cases." Id. at 771. This requirement of competence, however, was not
accompanied by a clear articulation of the level of effectiveness that is guaranteed by the
Constitution. Before Strickland v. Washington, the Court had not applied the McMann
language to a claim of ineffective assistance based on the defense counsel's failure to
investigate the case adequately. See Note, Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Criminal Defense Counsel A New Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 HARv. L. REv.
752, 755 (1980); see also infra note 48.
3 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
4 Id. at 2066.
5 Id. at 2068.
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counsel's errors, the outcome would have been different. 6 The
Court held that this standard is applicable to ineffective assistance
claims emanating from all proceedings-capital or otherwise.7
Because the defendant, Washington, could not meet either of the
two burdens established by the Court, the Supreme Court upheld
his sentence of death."
This Note will argue that the Supreme Court erred in establish-
ing its two-tiered test to determine whether counsel adequately as-
sisted the defendant. Imposing the burden upon the defendant of
proving both incompetence and prejudice is unnecessary and unfair.
The Court offered no convincing justification for why the defendant,
rather than the state, should be required to prove prejudice. Fur-
thermore, the Court could have directed trial court judges to use
the pretrial conference to discover an attorney's unreasonable be-
havior before the trial or sentencing hearing begins and thereby
prevent unnecessary, repetitive litigation due to defendants' charges
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court aggravated its error by applying an unfair and un-
necessarily vague standard to defendants accused of capital crimes.
The Court did not need to create such a vague standard of "reason-
ableness" for attorney conduct at a capital sentencing hearing. The
Court easily could have established concrete minimum guidelines
that attorneys must follow when representing a capital defendant.
Such guidelines would not greatly hinder counsel's independence
or imagination, but would increase the likelihood that defendants
receive adequate representation when facing the prospect of
execution.
II. FACTS
In September 1976, David Leroy Washington planned and
committed three stabbing murders during a ten-day period.9 Wash-
ington later surrendered and confessed to the third murder.10 The
State of Florida appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to repre-
sent him. 1 Counsel actively pursued pretrial matters and discovery
but experienced a sense of hopelessness after Washington
6 Id.
7 Id. at 2064.
8 Id. at 2071.
9 Id. at 2056. The "brutal" murders were accompanied by "torture, kidnapping,
severe assaults, attempted murder, attempted extortion and theft." Id.
10 Id. Washington was indicted for kidnapping and murder. Id.
I IId.
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confessed to the first two murders.1 2 Acting against counsel's ad-
vice, Washington pleaded guilty to all the charges, including the
three capital murder charges.' 3 In the plea colloquy, Washington
admitted his crimes and told the judge he had no significant crimi-
nal history. The trial judge told Washington that he respected
Washington's admission of responsibility but did not comment on
the upcoming sentencing.' 4
In preparing for the sentencing hearing, the defense counsel
talked to Washington about his background and spoke on the tele-
phone with his wife and his mother, but did not meet with them.' 5
He did not request a psychiatric examination,1 6 nor did he attempt
to locate character witnesses for his client.17 Counsel purposely de-
clined to present any character evidence in order to prevent the
state from cross-examining Washington about his background or
putting forth psychiatric testimony.' 8 Counsel also used other strat-
egies to prevent the introduction of evidence of Washington's crimi-
nal history.' 9
At the sentencing hearing, counsel asserted that Washington's
"remorse and acceptance of responsibility justified sparing him
from the death penalty."' 20 He also argued that Washington had no
criminal history and committed the crimes under mitigating circum-
stances. 2 1 He further stressed that Washington should be spared
the death penalty because he had surrendered, confessed, offered to
testify against his accomplices, and "was fundamentally a good per-
son who had briefly gone badly wrong in extremely stressful
12 Id Washington's confession was against the specific advice of appointed counsel.
Id.
13 Id. at 2057. Washington was indicted for "three counts of first degree murder and
multiple counts of robbery, kidnapping for ransom, breaking and entering and assault,
attempted murder and conspiracy to commit robbery." Id. at 2056-57.
14 Id at 2057.
15 Id.
16 Id. Counsel's interaction with Washington gave "no indication that respondent
had psychological problems." Id.
17 Id. The decision not to investigate and present character evidence resulted from
counsel's "sense of hopelessness" about overcoming the effect of Washington's confes-
sions. Id.
18 Id
19 Id. Counsel successfully moved to exclude Washington's "rap-sheet" from evi-
dence at the sentencing hearing. He did not request a presentence report because it
also would include Washington's criminal record. Id.
20 Id Counsel's "strategy" was founded on the trial judge's remarks at the hearing
as well as the judge's reputation for believing it essential that defendants accept respon-
sibility for their conduct. Id.
21 Id. The mitigating circumstances were extreme mental or emotional disturbance
caused by Washington's inability to support his family. Id
1984] 757
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circumstances." 22  Defense counsel did not cross-examine the
state's medical experts, who testified about the manner of death of
respondent's victims. 23
The trial judge found several aggravating factors24 with regard
to each of the three murders.25 He did not find any significant miti-
gating circumstances that outweighed the aggravating factors. 26 He
sentenced Washington to death on each of the three counts, and the
Florida Supreme Court upheld the sentences on direct appeal.27
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 In Florida, the sentencer is directed to balance the aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors in determining whether to impose the death sentence. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(2) (West Supp. 1985). For a brief description of such a balancing process, see
infra note 140. Florida's statute lists nine possible aggravating factors:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person. (c) The defendant knowingly
created a great risk of death to many persons. (d) The capital felony was commit-
ted while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of,
or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any
robbery, sexual battery, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlaw-
ful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb. (e) The capi-
tal felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest
or effecting an escape from custody. (f) The capital felony was committed for pe-
cuniary gain. (g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful
exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital
felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. (i) The capital felony was a homi-
cide and was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any
pretense of moral or legal justification.
Id. at § 921.141(5). The state's capital sentencing scheme also identifies seven sug-
gested mitigating circumstances:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (b) The capi-
tal felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance. (c) The victim was a participant in the defend-
ant's conduct or consented to the act. (d) The defendant was an accomplice in the
capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively mi-
nor. (e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domi-
nation of another person. (f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired. (g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Id. at § 921.145(6).
25 104 S. Ct. at 2057-58. The judge found that all three murders were especially
heinous, atrocious, and cruel, were committed in the course of at least one other dan-
gerous and violent felony, for pecuniary gain, to avoid arrest for accompanying crimes,
and to hinder law enforcement. Id. at 2058.
26 Id. at 2058. Washington's alleged lack of criminal history was offset by the fact
that he admitted he had "engaged in a course of stealing" during the murder spree.
The judge found that Washington could appreciate the criminality of his acts. He also
held that Washington's relative youth (26 years) was not a mitigating factor because he
had planned the crimes and had disposed of the proceeds from the thefts. Id.
27 Washington v. State, 362 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
David Leroy Washington was executed on July 13, 1984. Henderson, Executioner Stays
Busy in Florida, Dallas Times-Herald, Nov. 4, 1984, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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III. DISPOSITION OF APPEAL
Washington sought collateral relief in state court, asserting that
his defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at the sen-
tencing proceeding.28 The trial court denied relief, finding that the
evidence conclusively showed that the claim of ineffective assistance
was without merit.29 The trial court concluded that Washington
"had not shown that counsel's assistance reflected any substantial
and serious deficiency measurably below that of competent counsel
that was likely to have affected the outcome of the sentencing pro-
ceeding." 30 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
denial of relief. 31 That court concluded that Washington had not
made out a prima facie case of substantial deficiency or possible
prejudice. 32
After exhausting his appeals in the state courts, Washington
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.33 The
28 104 S. Ct. at 2058. Washington asserted that counsel was ineffective because he
failed to (1) move for a continuance to prepare for sentencing; (2) request a psychiatric
report; (3) investigate and present character witnesses; (4). seek a presentence investiga-
tion report; (5) present meaningful arguments to the sentencing judge; and (6) investi-
gate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine the medical experts. Id.
29 Id. The trial court held that the ineffective assistance claim was meritless because
there was no ground for counsel to request a continuance, the admission of a
presentence report would have undermined Washington's assertion of no criminal his-
tory, counsel's argument at sentencing hearing was "admirable," counsel's failure to
cross-examine the medical witnesses was not error, counsel's failure to order a psychia-
tric examination was not prejudicial error because there was no indication of major
mental illness at the time of the crimes, and counsel's failure to develop and present
character witnesses was not prejudicial error. Id. at 2058-59.
30 Id. at 2059. The trial court applied the standard for ineffective assistance claims
articulated by the Florida Supreme Court in Knight v. State, 394 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 1981).
104 S. Ct. at 2059. In Knight, the Florida Supreme Court considered an ineffective
assistance claim of a defendant facing the death penalty. The Florida Supreme Court
embraced the four-step analysis adopted in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) [Decoster II]. Knight, 394 So. 2d at 1000. The defendant must
show: (1) a specific omission or overt act by counsel upon which the claim is based; (2)
that the act was a "substantial and serious deficiency measurably below that of compe-
tent counsel"; and (3) that the deficiency was "substantial enough to demonstrate a prej-
udice to the defendant to the extent that there is a likelihood that the deficient conduct
affected the outcome of the court proceedings." Id. at 1000-01. Finally, if defendant
meets this burden, (4) the state can rebut the presumption of ineffective assistance by
showing "beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no prejudice in fact." Id. at 1001.
Interestingly, the Knight court recognized that in applying the standard of reason-
ableness, "death penalty cases are different, and consequently the performance of coun-
sel must be judged in light of these circumstances." Id. The United States Supreme
Court made no such comment in Washington. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
31 Washington v. State, 397 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1981).
32 Id. at 287.
33 104 S. Ct. at 2060. Washington filed the writ in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. Id.
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federal district court concluded that, although trial counsel had
erred by failing to further investigate mitigating evidence, Washing-
ton's defense was not prejudiced as a result of this error.34 The
court reiterated that there was not a significant possibility that any
of counsel's errors affected the outcome of the sentencing proceed-
ing.35 Thus, the court denied the petition.3 6
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court and remanded the case for new factfinding.3 7 The Elev-
enth Circuit, en banc, developed its own standards for considering
ineffective assistance claims. 38 The court of appeals stated that the
sixth amendment requires reasonably effective assistance under the
circumstances. 39 This standard imposes on counsel a duty to inves-
tigate. 40 Although it need not be exhaustive, the investigation must
include an independent examination of the relevant facts, circum-
stances, pleadings, and laws. 4 ' If many defenses are available, the
court of appeals usually will respect counsel's objective strategic de-
cision to forego some investigation in favor of another.42 This def-
erence to strategic choices is related to the reasonableness of
counsel's judgments on which the choices are based.43 When coun-
sel's strategy represents a reasonable choice of defense, based upon
reasonable assumptions, counsel need not investigate defenses that
he or she will not employ at trial.44
The court of appeals further noted that where the prosecution
is not directly responsible for the deficient performance by coun-




37 Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1263-64 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The Eleventh Circuit, then Unit B of the Fifth Circuit,
decided to rehear the case en banc after a Fifth Circuit panel, in Washington v. Strick-
land, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1982), had affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
with instructions to apply the standards for analyzing ineffective assistance claims that
the Fifth Circuit panel had developed in its opinion. Washington v. Strickland, 679 F.2d
23 (11 th Cir. 1982) (granting rehearing en banc).
38 Washington, 693 F.2d at 1250-62.
39 Id. at 1250. The Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals had "remarked in
passing that no special standard applies in capital cases." Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2060.
40 Washington, 693 F.2d at 1251.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 1254. The court of appeals stated that because advocacy is an art and not
a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel's informed
decision, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances if they are based on
professional judgment. Id. at 1254.
43 See id.
44 Id. at 1255.
45 Id. at 1262. In cases of "outright denial of counsel, of affirmative government
[Vol. 75760
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actual and substantial disadvantage to the course of his defense."'46
A majority of the en banc court of appeals agreed to remand the
case to apply the newly announced standards. 47
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the stan-
dards by which to judge a claim that defense counsel's specific er-
rors undermined defendant's constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.48
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court49 ruled that a
successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient represen-
tation prejudiced the defense. 50 Thus, the defendant must prove
that counsel's representation was unreasonable under professional
norms and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for coun-
sel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." 51 The Court rejected the notion that the defend-
ant's burden should be less in cases involving the death penalty.52
Furthermore, the Court established a strong presumption in ineffec-
tive assistance claims that counsel's performance falls within the
realm of reasonable professional assistance.53 The Court main-
tained that its holding did not establish mechanical rules, but rather
interference in the representation process, or of inherently prejudicial conflict of
interest," the Supreme Court has held that a special showing of prejudice is unnecessary
to reverse ajudgment because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Washington, 104 S. Ct.
at 2061 (citing Washington, 693 F.2d at 1258-59). See also infra note 161.
46 693 F.2d at 1262. The court of appeals reasoned that this standard would discour-
age insubstantial claims by requiring more than a showing, which could virtually always
be made, of some conceivable adverse effect on the defense from counsel's errors. Id at
1260-62. Though the appellate court did not require the defendant to prove that the
errors actually affected the outcome of the proceeding, "even if the defense suffered actual
and substantial disadvantage, the state may show in the context of all the evidence that it
remains certain beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the proceedings would
not have been altered but for the ineffectiveness of counsel." Id. at 1262 (citation omit-
ted) (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 1263.
48 Strickland v. Washington, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983) (grant of certiorari). The peti-
tion for certiorari presented a new issue before the Court. Justice O'Connor stated that
the Supreme Court "has never directly and fully addressed a claim of'actual ineffective-
ness' of counsel's assistance in a case going to trial." 104 S. Ct. at 2062.
49 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Jus-
tices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Justice Brennan concurred in
part and dissented in part. Justice Marshall dissented in full.
50 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
51 Id. at 2068. Cf. Washington, 693 F.2d at 1262 (defendant must show that counsel's
error worked an actual and substantial disadvantage to defense).
52 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
53 Id. at 2065-66.
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operated as a guide for the decision process. 54 It stressed that a
court's ultimate focus must be on the fundamental fairness of the
challenged proceeding. 55 Applying its new standard, the Court re-
versed the Eleventh Circuit and held that Washington's defense was
the result of reasonable professional judgment and that there was
no reasonable probability that any errors could have affected the
outcome of the sentencing hearing.56
The Court noted that no prior Supreme Court decision had di-
rectly addressed a claim of counsel's actual ineffective assistance in a
case at trial.57 Because the Court had not squarely decided the
proper standard for ineffective assistance, lower courts have
adopted varying tests with respect to the standard of prejudice that
a defendant must show in an ineffective assistance claim. 58 The
Court granted certiorari to clarify the proper standard.59
The Court held that the defendant must overcome two distinct
burdens to succeed with an ineffective assistance claim. The first
prong of the Strickland v. Washington test requires that the defendant
show that counsel's performance was inadequate. 60 In short, the de-
fendant must show that counsel's representation "fell below an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness." '6 1
A court deciding an ineffective assistance claim must determine
54 Id. at 2069.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 2071.
57 Id. at 2062. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
58 104 S. Ct. at 2063. The first standard established by the lower courts was the
"farce and mockery" standard. See Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945). The standard provided that defendant's sixth amendment right to
counsel was violated only when the lawyer's incompetence was so gross that the criminal
proceedings became "a farce and mockery ofjustice." Id. at 669. This standard fell into
disrepute when it became clear that the standard was so minimal that it was a mockery of
the sixth amendment itself. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.
1, 28 (1973). Over the past 20 years, most jurisdictions have substituted the "farce and
mockery" standard with a "community standards" or "reasonable lawyer" rule under
which the attorney must perform. Erickson, Standards of Competency for Defense Counsel in a
Criminal Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233, 239 (1979). These courts followed the teach-
ing of McMann, which demanded that attorneys provide "advice within the range of
competence demanded by attorneys in criminal cases." McMann, 397 U.S. 759, 771
(1969). All federal circuit courts and most state courts have adopted some formulation
of the "reasonably effective assistance" standard in assessing attorney performance.
Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2062 (citing Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d 149, 151-52
(2d Cir. 1983); Brief for United States at 3a-6a, United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039
(1984); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4TH 27, 99-157 (1980)).
59 Strickland v. Washington, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983) (grant of certiorari).
60 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
61 Id. at 2065. The Court considered more specific guidelines to be "not appropri-
ate." Id. The sixth amendment implicitly relies on the "legal profession's maintenance
of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in
762 [Vol. 75
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the reasonableness of counsel's conduct by looking at the facts of
the case,62 viewed at the time of counsel's conduct.63 The defen-
dant must identify counsel's acts or omissions that constitute an un-
reasonable professional judgment. 64 In light of all the
circumstances, the court must determine whether the identified acts
or omissions fell beyond the broad range of professionally compe-
tent assistance. 65
In making this determination, a court's scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential. 66 Because of the difficul-
ties of fairly evaluating counsel's performance with hindsight, the
court must strongly presume that counsel's conduct was within the
range of reasonable professional assistance." 67
Proof of an unreasonable error under professional norms will
not, in itself, require reversal of a conviction. 68 The second prong
of the Strickland v. Washington test requires that any deficiencies in
counsel's performance must prejudice the defense. 69 The defend-
ant has the burden of proving prejudice in most claims of ineffective
assistance. 70 The Court reasoned that attorney errors come in many
forms and are as likely to be harmless as prejudicial in any particular
case. 71 Because legal representation is not an exact science and the
its adversary process that the Amendment envisions." Id. (citing Michel v. New York,
350 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1955)).
62 Id. at 2065. The Court noted that "the performance inquiry must be whether
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances." Id. The Court
refused to prescribe a set of rigid rules that would define counsel duties in all cases.
Though the Court recognized several duties that counsel always owes the defendant, it
elected not to stultify the independence of counsel, but rather, to grant counsel "wide
latitude ... in making tactical decisions." Id.
63 Id. at 2066. The Court stressed that a court should be reluctant to second guess
counsel's strategic decisions with its benefit of hindsight. Justice O'Connor wrote that
"every effort [must) be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, .. and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 2065.
64 Id. at 2066.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2065.
67 Id. at 2066.
68 Id. at 2067.
69 Id.
70 Id In some cases prejudice is presumed. These include the "actual or construc-
tive denial of assistance altogether . . .and various kinds of state interference with
counsel's assistance." Id. (citing United States v. Cronic, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046-47 &
n.25 (1984)). Prejudice also is presumed "when counsel is burdened by an actual con-
flict of interest." Id. (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)). The Cuyler
language, however, does not rise to the level of a per se presumption because defendant
must demonstrate that counsel " 'actively represented conflicting interests' and 'that an
actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" Id. (quoting




same act or omission can have different consequences depending on
the circumstances, the defendant must show that the alleged errors
actually had an adverse effect on the defense. 72
The Court chose a stricter standard for prejudice than that of-
fered by the respondent Washington, but less burdensome than that
requested by the United States as amicus curiae. 73 The defendant
"must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. ' 74 The Court defined reasonable probability as a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment.75
Applying this standard to cases challenging a death sentence, the
Court stated that the "question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances did not warrant death." 76 A court hearing the ineffective
assistance claim must consider all the evidence in front of the sen-
tencer.77 The Court noted that a verdict weakly supported by the
evidence is more likely affected by counsel's errors than a verdict
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2068. Respondent argued that prejudice should be found when the errors
"impaired the presentation of the defense." Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 58,
Washington). The Court stated that this standard "provides no way of deciding what
impairments are sufficiently serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceed-
ing." Id. The Court also rejected the proposal by the United States that "counsel's defi-
cient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case." Id. The Court
stated that this standard, which is applied to newly discovered evidence, was too high for
claims alleging ineffective assistance. The Court reasoned that an "ineffective assistance
claim asserts the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceed-
ing is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker" than in a claim that presup-
poses that all the essential elements of a fair proceeding are present. Id. The Court
concluded that the "result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable ... even if the
errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have deter-
mined the outcome." Id. The Court, thus, implicitly rejected the standard of prejudice
espoused in Decoster III. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1979); see also supra note 30. That court held that defendant must prove that an adequate
counsel would likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Decoster III, 624 F.2d
at 206. Decoster III has been criticized for placing too great a burden upon defendants.
See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1261 (1982) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
74 104 S. Ct. at 2068 (emphasis supplied). This test for prejudice "finds its roots in
the test for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the
prosecution, United States v. Agurs, [427 U.S. 97, 104, 112-13 (1976)]. . . .and in the
test for materiality of testimony made unavailable to the defense by Government depor-
tation of a witness, United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, [458 U.S. 858, 872-74 (1981)]."
104 S. Ct. at 2068.
75 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
76 Id. at 2069. See supra note 24 (setting out Florida's statutory mitigating and aggra-
vating factors).
77 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
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with overwhelming record support.78
The Court provided lower tribunals with practical considera-
tions for the overall application of the two-tiered test. 79 First, the
test does not establish mechanical rules; courts must focus on the
fundamental fairness of the challenged proceeding.80 Second, a
court must determine whether a breakdown in the adversarial pro-
cess produced unreliable results in the challenged proceeding.8 1
Finally, an ineffectiveness claim is essentially a challenge to the fun-
damental fairness of the proceeding.8 2
The Court explained how the ineffective assistance claim
should affect the criminal justice system as a whole. The standards
should not be applied so as to encourage ineffective assistance
claims.8 3 Counsel's willingness to serve must not be adversely af-
fected.8 4 The independence of counsel should not be impaired, and
the trust between attorney and client should be preserved.8 5
Applying its new test to Washington's claim,8 6 the Court found
that counsel's conduct was reasonable.8 7 Furthermore, even if the
conduct were unreasonable, Washington suffered insufficient preju-
dice to warrant reversing his death sentence.88 With respect to the
performance component of the Strickland v. Washington test,
"[c]ounsel's strategy choice was well within the range of profession-
ally reasonable judgments, and the decision not to seek more char-
acter or psychological evidence than was already in hand was
likewise reasonable." 8 9 With respect to the prejudice component,





82 Id at 2070.
83 Id. at 2066.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 2070-71.
87 Id. at 2070.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 2071. The Court elaborated:
The trial judge's views on the importance of owning up to one's crimes were
well known to counsel. The aggravating circumstances were utterly overwhelming.
Trial counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with respondent that
character and psychological evidence would be of little help. . . .Restricting testi-
mony on respondent's character to what had come in at the plea colloquy ensured
that contrary character and psychological evidence and respondent's criminal his-
tory, which counsel had successfully moved to exclude, would not come in.





reasoned that "[g]iven the overwhelming aggravating factors, there
is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have
changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances . ... -91 Thus, defendant
failed twice by showing neither deficient performance nor sufficient
prejudice. 92 In the broad analysis, the Court found no showing that
counsel's alleged deficient assistance caused a breakdown in the ad-
versarial process, thus rendering the sentence unreliable. 93 The
Court concluded that Washington's sentencing proceeding was fun-
damentally fair.94
Justice Brennan concurred with the Court's opinion but dis-
sented from its judgment because, in his view, the death penalty is
in all instances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. 95 Justice Brennan would have
vacated Washington's sentence of death and remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings. 96
Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that defendants claim-
ing ineffective assistance must show that counsel's performance was
inadequate and that the defense was prejudiced thereby.97 He dis-
agreed, however, in the application of the standards in a capital
sentencing hearing.98 Justice Brennan noted that, because the con-
sequences of error are so great in capital cases, the Court has "con-
sistently required that capital proceedings be policed at all stages by
an especially vigilant concern for procedural fairness and for the ac-
curacy of factfinding." 99 Justice Brennan believed it essential that
the factfinder, upon sentencing in a capital case, consider all possi-
91 Id. The Court explained that the evidence counsel chose not to offer "would
barely have altered the sentencing profile .... ." Id. Numerous people would have
testified that respondent was "generally a good person and that a psychiatrist and a
psychologist believed he was under considerable emotional stress that did not rise to the
level of extreme disturbance." Id. The Court further asserted that the admission of
evidence defendant wanted to offer may even have harmed rather than helped his case.
Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. The Court stated that the "benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adver-
sarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at
2064.
94 Id. at 2071. The Court stated that the purpose of the effective assistance guaran-
tee of the sixth amendment is "simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair
trial." Id. at 2065.
95 Id. at 2071-72 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96 Id. at 2072 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97 Id. at 2072-73 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98 Id. at 2073 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99 Id.
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ble relevant information about the defendant.' 0 0 He noted that the
right to have all mitigating evidence considered loses its meaning if
defense counsel does not search for mitigating evidence.' 0 ' Justice
Brennan asserted that defense counsel's general duty to investigate
takes on supreme importance when developing mitigating evidence
before a judge or jury considering a death sentence. 10 2 He con-
cluded that claims of ineffective assistance in the context of a capital
crime, therefore, should be considered with utmost care.' 0 3
Justice Marshall dissented from both the opinion and the judg-
ment of the Court. 10 4 Justice Marshall argued that the Court erred
in establishing a performance standard of "simple" reasonable-
ness.' 0 5 Furthermore, he asserted that the majority erred in estab-
lishing its standard for prejudice. 10 6
Justice Marshall claimed that the majority's performance stan-
dard of reasonableness is so "malleable" and ambiguous that it pro-
vides no guidance to lawyers and lower courtjudges. 10 7 The dissent
asserted that many aspects of the criminal defense attorney's duties
could be made the subject of uniform standards.' 08 He contended
that the Court should have developed particularized standards to
ensure that defense counsel renders effective legal assistance. 10 9
The dissent also objected to the Court's prejudice standard.
Justice Marshall argued that estimating prejudice caused by incom-
petent counsel is too difficult. 110 Not only is it difficult to imagine
how competent counsel would have handled the case, but any evi-
dence of prejudice to the defendant may not be reflected in the
record because of the unreasonable actions of defense counsel. 111
100 Id. at 2074 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citingJurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
101 Id. at 2074 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Com-
ment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing,
83 COLUM. L. Rav. 1544, 1549 (1983)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id at 2075 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105 Id
106 Id at 2076 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107 Ida at 2075 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall believed that the majority
standard tells judges nothing beyond requiring them to "advert to their own intuitions
regarding what constitutes 'professional' representation." Id.
108 Id at 2076 (Marshall, J, dissenting). Activities amenable to judicial oversight are,
according to Justice Marshall, "preparing for a trial, applying for bail, conferring with
one's client, making timely objections to signficant, arguably erroneous rulings of the







Furthermore, Justice Marshall asserted that, though seemingly
guilty, a defendant who does not receive adequate legal assistance
does not receive due process. 1 2 Thus, Justice Marshall would hold
that constitutionally inadequate performance by defense counsel re-
quires a new trial whether or not the defendant suffered
prejudice." 13
Despite his objections to the prejudice requirement, Justice
Marshall assumed that a showing of prejudice would be required
and suggested an appropriate standard for prejudice. If a defendant
burdened with incompetent counsel can "establish a significant
chance that the outcome would have been different"-rather than
reasonable probability-the defendant should be entitled to a new
sentencing hearing.' 14
The dissent also attacked the majority's suggestion that lower
courts should strongly presume that defense counsel's conduct was
constitutionally acceptable. 115 Though Justice Marshall believed
that defendants have the burden of proof in claims of ineffective
assistance, he argued that a strong presumption imposes an unusu-
ally heavy burden on defendants."l 6 He asserted that holding coun-
sel to prevailing professional norms grants counsel sufficient
flexibility to respond to problems at trial."17 Justice Marshall dis-
agreed with the majority's speculation that a lesser presumption
would encourage frivolous suits and clog the courts."" He argued
that courts are capable of disposing of meritless claims without
presuming that the defendant's claim is insubstantial." 9
Finally, Justice Marshall attacked the majority's notion that
counsel's duties at a capital sentencing hearing do not differ from
those at an ordinary trial.' 20 LikeJustice Brennan, the dissent wrote
that "the standards for determining what constitutes 'effective
assistance' [must] be applied especially stringently in capital
sentence proceedings."' 12'
112 Id. at 2077 (Marshall, J. dissenting). Justice Marshall asserted that inadequate
legal assistance effectively denies defendants the sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel. Such a denial by the state constitutes a denial of due process under the four-
teenth amendment. Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2080 n.16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 2077-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2078 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117 Id. Thus, it seems thatJustice Marshall would hold the defendant to the burden of
proving that defense counsel failed to meet prevailing professional norms.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2079 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "[t]he Court has repeat-
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In applying these alternative standards to the facts, Justice Mar-
shall concluded that Washington received constitutionally inade-
quate representation, and thus, was entitled to a new sentencing
proceeding.1 22 Justice Marshall contended that counsel made "vir-
tually no investigation of the possibility of obtaining testimony...
to counteract the impression conveyed by the trial that [Washing-
ton] was little more than a cold-blooded killer." 123 He argued that
evidence of defendant's family and social connections is crucial in a
sentencing hearing, and defense counsel's failure to make a signifi-
cant effort to determine what evidence might be gained from Wash-
ington's relatives and acquaintances cannot be considered
"reasonable.' ' 124 Becausejuries often show mercy when exposed to
facets of defendant's personality and life, Justice Marshall concluded
that counsel's failure to investigate and present such evidence fore-
closed a "significant chance" that Washington would have received
a life sentence. 125 Counsel's unreasonable failure to investigate,
combined with the significant chance of a different outcome at the
sentencing hearing, established a violation of Washington's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 126
V. ANALYSIS
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court continued its ef-
fort to restrict the effectiveness of collateral attacks upon verdicts,
particularly in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.' 27
edly acknowledged that the Constitution requires stricter adherence to procedural safe-
guards in a capital case than in other cases." Id. He pointed for support to the Court's
language in Woodson v. North Carolina:
"[The penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-
year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the de-
termination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case."
104 S. Ct. at 2079 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted)).
122 Id. at 2080-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123 Id at 2080 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The "humanizing" evidence available to
counsel was testimony from Washington's friends, relatives, and former employers that
he was a "responsible, nonviolent man, devoted to his family, and active in the affairs of
his church." Id.
124 Id. at 2080-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125 Id. at 2081 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
126 Id
127 See, e.g.,Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983) (appointed counsel has no consti-
tutional duty to assert all nonfrivolous claims requested by defendant on appeal); Morris
v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983) (reversing Ninth Circuit's holding that the sixth
amendment required a "meaningful attorney-client relationship"); Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S 335 (1980) (where attorney represents multiple defendants and defendant has
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Although it did not embrace the standard most burdensome to the
defendant, 128 the Court imposed requirements that will make it un-
likely that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance will succeed. 129
The Court's imposition of dual burdens upon defendants facing the
death penalty is disturbing. The Court has expressed its preference
for limiting appeals and preserving verdicts at the expense of pro-
tecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.' 3 0
A. THE REASONABLENESS COMPONENT
The Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington adopted the rea-
sonableness standard after balancing its strengths and weaknesses.
Though a reasonableness standard may be appropriate in certain
criminal cases, the Court could have strengthened the effectiveness
of such a standard by requiring judges to review the adequacy of
counsel's performance before the trial or sentencing hearing. The
reasonableness standard, however, is not appropriate in capital sen-
tencing hearings. By recognizing the differences between trials and
capital sentencing hearings, the Court could have avoided applying
the reasonableness standard to sentencing hearings. The Court in-
stead could have developed concrete standards to guide and evalu-
ate attorney conduct during capital sentencing hearings.
Persons claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show
that counsel acted "unreasonably" as measured by the prevailing
standards of the profession.' 3 ' This open-ended standard has its
strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it provides attorneys
with flexibility to try cases with regard to the relevant facts at hand.
Because cases are so varied in nature, forcing lawyers to take specific
steps in every case might be wasteful and debilitating. Furthermore,
judges may have difficulty in applying rules to such a vast array of
circumstances. It might be a mistake to deny judges discretion to
determine when attorneys need not go through certain standardized
procedures.
not argued conflict of interest below, defendant must show counsel's conflict of interest
actually affected adequacy of representation); see generally Note, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments-Appointed Counsel Has No Constitutional Duty to Argue All Nonfrivolous Issues on Appeal,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353 (1983) (discussing Jones v. Barnes and the Court's
desire to shorten lengthy appellate process).
128 See 104 S. Ct. at 2068. For an example of a case imposing the standard most bur-
densome to the defendant, see Decoster III, 624 F.2d at 208 (defendant must show seri-
ous incompetency in counsel's performance and likelihood that counsel's inadequacy
affected outcome of trial). See also supra notes 30 & 73.
129 See infra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
130 See infra notes 138-49 & 152-62.
131 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
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On the other hand, the vague standard of "reasonableness"
provides very little guidance to attorneys and judges. Counsel will
behave under their own notions of what is reasonable, and judges
will apply their own personal conceptions about attorneys' duties to
defendants. Thus, the Court is really setting no standard at all be-
yond the notion that counsel must provide competent legal assist-
ance to the client.
The Court balanced these pros and cons of the "reasonable-
ness" standard and opted for providing counsel with wide latitude
in making strategic decisions about the case.13 2 It may be right to
provide attorneys with flexibility in making decisions about how to
present the defense. But the Court could have strengthened its po-
sition if it had required some type of pretrial or pre-hearing supervi-
sion by the trial judge.1 33 A judge easily could review the pretrial
conduct of counsel at a pretrial conference and determine whether
counsel has performed the necessary investigations.13 4 Before the
trial or sentencing hearing begins, the judge can determine whether
counsel acted "reasonably."'13 5 This procedure would alleviate the
Court's fear of repeated litigation and overcrowded court dockets
caused by post-trial ineffective assistance claims. The judge would
review and remedy counsel's conduct before trial and would elimi-
nate the possibility that the verdict would be reversed and a new
trial required because of counsel's inadequate investigations.13 6
132 Id.
133 See Note, supra note 2, at 773-75. This supervision would be appropriate to ensure
that counsel made reasonable investigations before a trial or sentencing hearing to un-
cover any information that would benefit the defense. The pretrial conference need not
be limited to capital cases, although that is where it is most urgently needed. The trial
court can use a pretrial conference in any criminal case to review the evidence and deter-
mine whether defense counsel made reasonable investigations. Such a procedure would
be well worth the expenditure of resources. Claims of ineffective assistance are rapidly
becoming popular amongjailhouse lawyers. See Tybor, Trial and Error: The Issue of Incom-
petent Legal Counsel, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1983, §4, at 1, col. 1.
134 The lawyer could give the judge a report on all the investigations that were made
and whether the attorney followed all the leads that could uncover beneficial evidence.
During the conference the trial judge can review the state's evidence to help determine
whether defense counsel invested the necessary resources to provide competent
representation.
135 Of course this procedure will only determine whether counsel made any errors
before trial begins. Thejudge will be on hand to evaluate any errors made during trial.
The judge at the pretrial conference can look at counsel's investigations of all the issues,
including character evidence, and determine if the investigation was adequate under the
circumstances.
136 If the judge determined that the attorney's report, see supra note 134, was unsatis-
factory, he or she could grant a continuance and order investigations or further prepara-
tions for trial to be made. The trial judge could even discharge the defense counsel if
the attorney is not willing to make the necessary preparations.
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The Court failed to advocate a procedure whereby judges could de-
tect and remedy attorney incompetence with the minimum amount
of interference with attorney independence and jury verdicts.
Although the Court may have been correct in providing counsel
wide latitude in preparing the defense in ordinary criminal cases, it
was wrong in applying this same vague "reasonableness" standard
in capital cases. The Court missed an opportunity to impose con-
crete standards for attorney competence in capital sentencing hear-
ings. Because capital punishment sentencing proceedings are
fundamentally different from any other type of criminal proceed-
ing, 137 the Court could have carved out some basic standards to aid
attorneys and judges in determining whether counsel's performance
was reasonable.13 8
Despite the majority's contrary conclusion, 139 a capital sentenc-
ing hearing is different from an ordinary trial.140 The situations in a
capital sentencing hearing are not so varied and complex that the
establishment of rules would be counterproductive.' 4 1 A defense
attorney must persuade the sentencing authority that a sentence of
life is preferable and more appropriate than a sentence of death. 42
This is done by exposing the "human" qualities of the defendant
that mitigate the monstrous acts that the defendant committed. 143
For example, by presenting evidence that the defendant was abused
as a child or that the defendant was acting under extraordinarily
stressful circumstances, an attorney may persuade a sentencing au-
thority that mercy is the appropriate response. 144 This mitigating
"human" evidence can be obtained only by a thorough investigation
137 See Goodpaster, The Trialfor Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303 (1983) ("Trials about life differ radically in form and in
issues addressed from those about the commission of a crime, and the cases must be
tried differently.").
138 Id. at 317-34.
139 See infra note 147.
140 A sentencing hearing is essentially a trial with regard to punishment after a deter-
mination of guilt. At the hearing the state and the defense present aggravating and
mitigating factors respectively, and each side argues for the appropriate punishment.
The sentencer weighs these factors and determines if death is the appropriate sentence.
See Comment, supra note 101, at 1547-48 & n.16.
141 Thirty-six states allow for a death penalty, and thirty-five of the states have sen-
tencing hearing procedures similar to each other. For a description of the basic provi-
sions of these statutes, see Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 101-19 (1980).
New Jersey's death penalty statute, which differs from the other thirty-five, is set out in
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1982). See Comment, supra note 101, at 1547 n.15.
142 See Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 334-39.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 323-25.
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into the defendant's life history.1 45
Because sentencing hearings typically involve similar elements,
the Court could have adopted standards for effective assistance of
counsel without impairing attorney independence. The standards
for effective assistance in a capital sentencing hearing include: (1)
thorough crime and life-history investigations in preparation for the
sentencing hearing; and (2) presentation of all reasonably available
mitigating evidence that would be helpful to the defendant. 146
Although the Court easily could have established these stan-
dards, it ignored the differences between a capital sentencing hear-
ing and other types of criminal proceedings. 147 Perhaps the Court
did not want to carve out an exception for capital cases and create
precedent for defendants in other types of cases to seek exceptions
to its two-tiered rule. The Court expressed its fear of encouraging
other defendants to bring ineffective assistance claims. 148 But, as
argued above, the Court could have embraced pretrial procedures
for determining counsel's reasonableness without prolonging the
appellate process. 149 By failing even to address the notion of con-
crete standards for attorney conduct at a capital sentencing hearing,
the Court unnecessarily limited the rights of criminal defendants.
B. THE PREJUDICE COMPONENT
The Supreme Court placed upon defendants the burden of
proving that counsel's incompetence prejudiced the defense. 150
145 Id.
146 Id. at 362.
147 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The Court stated:
A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this case, however, is suffi-
ciently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for
decision. . . that counsel's role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel's role at
trial-to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result
under the standards governing decision.
Id. (citing Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418, 3425 (1983); Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 438 (1981)). This sentence is the extent of the Court's discussion on the dif-
ferences between a capital sentencing hearing and other criminal proceedings. The
Court looked only at the sterile procedures of the sentencing hearing to determine its
similarity to a regular criminal proceeding. It thus ignored the fundamental distinction
between the types of punishment involved in the two proceedings. Justice Stewart has
stated the distinction most clearly:
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment, not in
degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection
of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is
unique finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in the concept of
humanity.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
148 104 S. Ct. at 2066. See generally Note, supra note 127.
149 See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
150 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
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Rather than require the defendant to prove prejudiced, the Court
could have required the state to prove that defense counsel's incom-
petence was harmless error. Requiring the state to prove harmless
error at least in capital cases would have been consistent with previ-
ous Supreme Court decisions imposing special safeguards upon the
administration of capital punishment.' 5 '
The Court was harsh in its demand that defendants prove that
counsel's incompetence prejudiced the defense. Once defendants
prove that counsel rendered ineffective assistance, they must show
that counsel's incompetence created a reasonable probability that
the results of the proceedings would have been different.' 52 This
two-tiered test is an unnecessary burden upon criminal defend-
ants-capital or otherwise. The Court's decision is reasonable in
seeking to preserve a verdict in which counsel's representation
could not have affected the result. But the Court gave no persuasive
justification as to why the defendant should have to prove prejudice.
Once the defendant proves that counsel acted unreasonably, the de-
fendant should not bear an additional burden. The Court did not
address a more reasonable alternative that would place the burden
of proving no prejudice on the state. Once the defendant conclu-
sively shows that counsel rendered inadequate representation, the
judge would order a new trial unless the state could show harmless
error. 153
151 See infra notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
152 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
153 See United States v. Decoster [Decoster III], 624 F.2d 196, 290-95 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting) (although counsel's incompetent representation constitutes a
sixth amendment violation, government may prove harmless error to avoid needless re-
trial); Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 352-56 (automatic reversal when attorney incom-
petence prejudices defense in pervasive but undeterminable manner; government
required to prove harmless error in other cases); Note, supra note 2, at 768-70 (govern-
ment must prove beyond reasonable doubt that lawyer's substantial violations did not
affect verdict). Some circuits have adopted the harmless error view. See Coles v. Peyton,
389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.) (prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that
ineffective assistance did not adversely affect defense), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
Compare other cases, however, holding that defendant has the burden of showing preju-
dice. See Cooper v. Campbell, 597 F.2d 628 (8th Cir. 1979); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586
F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979); United States v.
Williams, 575 F.2d 388 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977), 439 U.S. 842 (1978).
Sixteen states also have indicated agreement. See State v. Anonymous, 34 Conn. Supp.
656, 384 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. 1978); State v. Kenner, 336 So. 2d 824 (La. 1976); David
v. State, 40 Md. App. 467, 391 A.2d 872 (1978), modified and remanded on procedural
grounds, 285 Md. 19, 400 A.2d 406 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 375 Mass. 530,
378 N.E.2d 661 (1978); People v. Garcia, 398 Mich. 250, 247 N.W.2d 547 (1976); Estes
v. State, 326 So. 2d 786 (Miss. 1976); Cox v. State, 572 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
State v. Mays, 203 Neb. 487, 279 N.W.2d 146 (1979); State v. Mathis, 293 N.C. 660, 239
S.E.2d 245 (1977); State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537 (N.D. 1978); Commonwealth v.
Garcia, 478 Pa. 406, 387 A.2d 46 (1978); State v. Ambrosino, 114 R.I. 99, 329 A.2d 398
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If the state must prove harmless error, both parties assume bur-
dens when counsel for the defendant is found incompetent. Under
the Strickland v. Washington test, it will be extremely difficult for a
defendant to show that the case was prejudiced by counsel's incom-
petence. Evidence of prejudice may be unavailable precisely be-
cause counsel failed to make a reasonable investigation.154
Requiring defendants to show what evidence would have been pro-
duced, however, is reasonable because they are in the best position
to know what evidence was available to the defense. But defendants
are not in any better position than the state to demonstrate the ef-
fect that new evidence would have had on the outcome. 55 Thus,
there is no reason to give the defendant the dual burden of provid-
ing the new evidence and proving prejudice.' 56
The harmless error rule advocated here does not require a per
se reversal once attorney incompetence is established. The state,
however, would have to rebut the presumption that such incompe-
tence rendered the process unfair by proving that the incompetence
was only harmless error.' 57 Considering the importance of compe-
tent counsel to an effective defense, such a presumption is reason-
able. The Court's presumption that attorney incompetence is
harmless unless proved otherwise is counterintuitive. 5 8
Requiring the state to prove harmless error in capital cases is
both an appropriate safeguard and a procedural protection consis-
tent with previous decisions of the Court. In capital cases, the
consequences of an erroneous judgment, for society and the de-
(1974); State v. Pieschke, 262 N.W.2d 40 (S.D. 1978); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40, 147
S.E.2d 762 (1966); State v. Cobb, 22 Wash. App. 221, 589 P.2d 297 (1978); State v.
Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974).
154 104 S. Ct. at 2076 (Marshall, J., dissenting). At the very least, inquiry into the
claim of prejudice would require unguided speculation. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 490-91 (1978) (inquiry into whether conflict of interest of defense counsel
actually prejudiced defense not susceptible of intelligent, even-handed application);
Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 348 (no reliable way to determine impact of attorney's
deficient performance).
155 See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1262 (11th Cir. 1982) (en banc),
rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
156 Cf. McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 220 (8th Cir. 1974) (defendant alleging
denial of effective assistance of counsel has "initial burden of showing the existence of
admissible evidence which could have been uncovered by reasonable investigation" that
counsel failed to produce; where defendant unable to make showing due to changed
circumstances, state must show harmless error beyond reasonable doubt); see also Good-
paster, supra note 137, at 347.
157 See supra note 153. The state would have to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the attorney's errors were harmless. A lesser burden of proof standard would not ade-
quately protect the defendant. See Peyton, 389 F.2d at 226.
158 See supra note 153.
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fendant, are unparalleled. 159 A prisoner, later found to be innocent,
cannot be released once the prisoner has been executed. 160 The
state, therefore, should take all precautions to make certain that
those defendants put to death are guilty beyond even a shadow of a
reasonable doubt. Judges or juries also must reach the right sen-
tencing decision because their sentence cannot be undone. By plac-
ing an onerous burden upon capital defendants, the Supreme Court
created the potential for intolerable situations; defendants could be
put to death because they did not have the resources to prove that
counsel's incompetence prejudiced their defense. Thus, it is en-
tirely reasonable and consistent with Supreme Court precedent to
make an exception to the proposed harmless error rule in capital
cases and make proof of attorney incompetence a per se reversible
error. 161 If the Court did not wish to go this far, it at least should
159 Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2073 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
160 Furthermore, the rule of law is undermined when an innocent man is put to death
because the injustice can never be fully corrected.
161 See Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 350-52 (overwhelming importance of present-
ing mitigating evidence in capital case justifies per se reversal upon finding of defense
attorney incompetence). The Constitution imposes special safeguards on the adminis-
tration of capital punishment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)
(juries cannot have unfettered discretion in determining whether to impose death pen-
alty). Capital punishment must be imposed with a greater degree of reliability than a
noncapital sentence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(sentencers can not be prevented from considering mitigating evidence); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death
sentences for first degree murder are unconstitutional). Thus, it is entirely reasonable
for the Court to provide a capital defendant with a greater guarantee of effective assist-
ance to make certain that a death sentence is not imposed "in spite of factors which may
call for a less severe penalty." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. See generally Comment, supra note
101, at 1545-49.
In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion), the Court struck down a
death penalty statute that prevented the sentencer from considering mitigating evidence
on behalf of the defendant. When an attorney fails to present mitigating evidence to the
sentencer, counsel is, in effect, preventing the sentencer from deliberating upon that
evidence. Furthermore, the failure by a sentencer to consider mitigating evidence, in
this situation because of attorney incompetence, can lead to a sentence that is arbitrary
and capricious. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Defendants of similar culpability may not be treated similarly if defense attorneys fail to
present necessary mitigating evidence in every case. Finally, the Court has stated that
the death penalty can be imposed only if it is proportionate to the defendant's culpabil-
ity. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
When a defense attorney fails to represent the client adequately, the sentencer may be
unaware of mitigating factors that may limit the defendant's culpability. Thus, an in-
competent attorney may preclude a constitutional death sentence.
Other cases where the Court has found per se reversible error in ineffective assist-
ance claims are not helpful here. Those cases support a finding of per se reversible error
when the state has interfered with the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (absence of counsel at trial); Hamil-
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have required the state to prove harmless error in capital cases. 162
The greater protection for capital defendants is a logical extension
of other procedural protections afforded to defendants facing the
prospect of execution.
Although the Supreme Court made several errors in developing
the standard for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Court may have reached the right conclusion in this particular case.
It is not clear whether counsel's actions in this case were unreasona-
ble. He undoubtedly could and should have investigated the de-
fendant's background. He had an obligation to overcome his "sense
of helplessness" and search for any possible mitigating evidence.
Counsel's failure even to meet with Washington's wife or mother 163
demonstrates a lack of thoroughness in his investigation.
Counsel's lack of thoroughness in investigating, however, does
not necessarily indicate incompetence or apathy on his part. Coun-
sel realized that any character testimony would be rebutted by the
state's presentation of evidence about Washington's criminal back-
ground. Thus, Washington may not have been better off having the
character testimony introduced. The standards of reasonable
ton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (absence of counsel at arraignment); see also Geders
v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (conviction reversed because defense counsel not
allowed to meet with client during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
(1975) (conviction reversed because statute prevented final summation by defense coun-
sel). Per se reversible error is also established when defense counsel represents defend-
ants with actual conflicting interests. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980);
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). These cases are distinguishable and have
been forcefully distinguished by the courts. See, e.g., Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d
at 1258-59. In Washington, the defendant was not totally deprived of counsel as was the
defendant in Gideon. He did not claim that the state interfered with his relationship with
his attorney as was the case in Geders. Finally, there is no evidence that the attorney was
burdened by an actual conflict of interest as in Cuyler. Id.
162 The Court has often held that the need for procedural safeguards is particularly
great when a life is at stake. The Court has prohibited procedures in capital cases that
may have been accepted under ordinary circumstances. See, e.g. Bullington v. Missouri,
451 U.S. 430 (1981) (capital sentencing proceeding sufficiently similar to trial on guilt or
innocence such that DoubleJeopardy clause prevents state from seeking greater penalty
on retrial); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (may not impose death sentence where
jury not permitted to consider verdict of guilt of lesser included non-capital offense);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (may not preclude sentencer
from considering mitigating evidence in capital cases); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977) (may not impose death sentence based, in part, on information that defendant
had no opportunity to deny or explain); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (plurality opinion) (mandatory death sentence for first degree murder impermis-
sible). Justice O'Connor has stated that the Court has taken great care to minimize the
chance that a sentence of death is "imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mis-
take." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
also Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2073-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
163 Washington, 104 S. Ct. at 2057.
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representation cited in this Note do not require presentation of
"mitigating" evidence if such evidence is not helpful to the defend-
ant. 164 In this case, counsel's decision to forego the opportunity to
present character testimony may have been reasonable because the
testimony ultimately may have damaged the case.
Of course, any analysis as to the probable effect of evidence that
was never introduced is highly speculative. 165 One would feel much
more comfortable with the verdict if counsel had made an exhaus-
tive investigation and then decided to introduce no character evi-
dence. Because counsel made such a cursory investigation, and
because the consequences of an erroneous verdict are so great, the
Court should have reversed and remanded the judgment for further
proceedings. By doing so, the Court would have sent a signal to
lawyers assisting capital defendants that the Constitution will not
tolerate any cutting of corners in capital cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that claim-
ants asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel must meet two
burdens. First, the defendant must show that counsel's representa-
tion was unreasonable; second, the defendant must show that coun-
sel's errors prejudiced the defense. The Court asserted that this test
applied even when the defendant is facing a sentence of death. The
two-tiered standard is unnecessary and unfair to the defendant.
Once the defendant shows that the defense counsel was incompe-
tent, the state should be required to prove that counsel's errors did
not prejudice the defense. The Court's harsh ruling is aggravated
by the fact that defendants facing a death sentence must also meet
the dual burden. The Court could have developed concrete guide-
lines that counsel must follow in a capital sentencing hearing. It
also could have embraced a pretrial hearing as a method of discov-
ering and remedying attorney errors that occur before trial. The
Court did not choose to take any innovative steps to ensure that
defendant's receive adequate counsel at trial. Its failure to do so
results in the further erosion of the rights of criminal defendants.
DAVID J. GROSS
164 See Goodpaster, supra note 137, at 351 (failure to present mitigating evidence in
capital sentencing hearing not inherently prejudicial where prosecution would present
more aggravating case in rebuttal to particular mitigating evidence).
165 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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